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**in** Property Council of Australia

20 September 2024

Annalisa Heger  
Assistant Secretary  
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Dear Ms Heger

## **Mergers and acquisitions reform – notification thresholds – carve out or material amendments needed**

Treasury's consultation paper (the paper) on the reporting thresholds under the reforms to Australia's merger and acquisition regime demonstrates an arguably worthy intent to change behaviour in other sectors that will make housing among other property and city assets a lot more costly.

It is surprising and disappointing that the substantial and presumably unintentional property impacts were not anticipated prior to the release of the paper.

The Property Council is the peak body for the leading owners and investors in Australia's \$670 billion property industry. We represent owners, fund managers, superannuation trusts, developers, and investors across all four quadrants of property investments: debt, equity, public and private.

The property industry is sensitive to changes in the mergers and acquisitions control regime due to three factors: the value, the volume and the frequency of transactions which take place across the spectrum of residential and commercial assets.<sup>1</sup> A control regime which creates barriers to entry or expansion in the property market will prevent or slow deals and diminish economic activity across an industry that employs almost 1.5 million people.

**In particular, the proposed notification thresholds harm the residential market's ability to price, finance and deliver new homes to rent and buy. Unnecessary and slow regulator review will push up house prices, hurt Australian homebuyers and stop us reaching the National Housing Accord target of 1.2 million new homes by 2029.**

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<sup>1</sup> Property Council commentary does not apply to shopping centre or retail matters, and this submission is limited to other asset classes within the property sector.

Property must be carved out, or the cost of a new Sydney home will go up by \$30,000 and:

1. **almost wipe out the benefit of first homeowner stamp duty exemptions**
2. **impose an additional nearly four months for a typical household to save before purchasing**
3. **add nearly \$70,000 to an average household mortgage, representing extra repayments of nearly \$200 every month.**

The proposed thresholds will be a significant roadblock to inbound investment into property.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

1. As the **property sector** is clearly not the target of the proposed merger reforms, it **should be exempt** from their application given the capital-intensive nature of property transactions. **Carve outs apply in the US, Canada and Korea** – all direct competitors for investment.
2. **If a property carve out or threshold change is rejected** for ideological one-size-fits-all reasons that do not apply in competitor economies, owing to the material uncertainty in relation to the matters set out in this submission **Treasury's consultation process should be slowed down**. Adequate time would enable a thorough review of the threshold mechanisms, with industry-informed modelling completed and publicly released consistent with the approach outlined in Treasury's August 2024 *Revitalising National Competition Policy* consultation paper. The rushed and inadequate consultation on Build-to-rent housing reforms have had a materially adverse impact on the Government's ability to meet its own housing target policy objectives and similar damaging haste should be avoided.
3. The **ordinary course of business exclusion to remove land must be reconsidered**.
4. The retrospective **lookback test** period of three years should be **removed**.
5. **There will not be proper resourcing of the regulator** to deal with an overwhelming volume of vanilla transactions, which is the government's responsibility. To ensure that the volumes that will be captured by the notification thresholds can be processed in a timely manner:
  - a. a **deemed approval process where the regulator fails assessment timeframes**; and
  - b. a clear template of submission/**assessment requirements must be developed and communicated to industry**, so that the regulator is not permitted to require overly onerous or uncertain information.
6. Assessment **timeframes must run from lodgement without any stop-clock mechanism**.
7. **Definitions must not be left to regulations**, especially definitions that are so critical to parliament and industry's understanding of the impact of the proposed reforms. Those definitions must be considered and clearly articulated to stakeholders, with adequate time for formal consultation and feedback.
8. The Chair of the ACCC should be provided with the legislative **power to assess the risk profile of any industry or class of asset, and to relieve that industry or class or asset, from notification requirements** if the Chair is satisfied that notifications from that industry or class of asset is materially overrepresented.

The Property Council previously made a submission responding to the exposure draft of the *Treasury Laws Amendment Bill: Acquisitions (Bill)*, which is set out at **Appendix A**. Both submissions should be considered together.

### **Economic modelling of reforms**

As part of its *Revitalising National Competition Policy* consultation paper, Treasury is proposing a new National Competition Reform Program to identify reforms to improve competitiveness, choice for consumers and put downwards pressure on prices in the broader economy.

The Council on Federal Financial Relations (CFFR) has accepted the practice of undertaking economic modelling of any proposed reforms, including on reduction or increase of government revenue.

The Treasurers' foreword to the consultation paper states that the revitalising of Australia's National Competition Policy is the next step following reforms the merger control regime. As such, the government should release economic modelling consistent with the approach outlined in the paper, including but not limited to economic growth, productivity, government revenue and impacts to households and consumers.

### **Targeted mandatory notification thresholds are too low**

The Property Council agrees with the principles of the paper which state that the notification thresholds should be targeted appropriately, and the broader merger control regime be risk-based.

However, in practice, the proposed notification thresholds represent a material risk to the property industry.

Treasury's claim that the thresholds are a risk-based, targeted approach is misguided. The proposed thresholds cover the entire economy and are not targeted at the sectors of concern that have otherwise been identified by the regulator.

The thresholds show a lack of regard for the capital-intensive nature of the property sector and the land costs that are embedded as a core part of property acquisitions. For many developers, land is best characterised as inventory rather than an asset. The nature of a residential property developer for instance – particularly those listed on the ASX – is that there is a constant need to restock as land is sold to maintain a healthy development pipeline. The proposed thresholds do not take this into account.

In addition, acquisitions where the target does not meet the monetary thresholds, but where the acquiring party meets the turnover threshold, will be aggregated over a period of three years based on a look back test. If they meet the \$10m / \$40m threshold they will be notifiable. For many residential developers in particular, there is a real risk that the proposed thresholds will capture nearly every land transaction across their portfolios.

The proposed thresholds do not consider the impact on the property sector.

We have been advised that the intention of the changes is to capture a similar volume of transactions to what is currently being reviewed by the ACCC. While estimates suggest 300-500 transactions each year would be captured, we expect many hundreds of transactions each year from the property sector alone.

**The Property Council's analysis indicates at least 1,340 notifiable transactions will occur each year in the property sector alone.**

In the last decade there were 5,407 commercial property transactions valued greater than \$10m, averaging 540 each year. This figure represents 74 per cent of all commercial transactions across the same period.

While residential property transaction figures are harder to obtain as there is no single register and transaction methods vary (for example, option agreements and joint venture arrangements), we anticipate this number would be many multiples of commercial property transactions.

Analysis indicates that there may be around 800 residential projects per annum with 10 or more dwellings. Most of these will be identifiable and represent a small fraction of total residential/land deals. More specifically, our analysis indicates that across the past five years there have been 100 residential transactions each year which exceed \$10 million in masterplanned communities alone. Masterplanned communities represent only a subset of the broader residential property market. This estimate also excludes transactions affected by way of option agreements, joint venture agreements or project development agreements. Each of these transaction types are far more common, meaning that the 100 notifiable transaction estimate is a small fraction of total residential property transactions.

The property industry also relies heavily on capital partnering to deliver built-form outcomes. There is the real potential that in addition to the initial property transaction, which is notifiable, each capital partnering event across a project will trigger a separate notifiable event, as will sub-division for mixed use asset development. This will significantly increase the number of notifiable deals even further.

Our analysis suggests that the following property sector participants are likely to be captured by the proposed regime:

- **Developers:** mid-large developers (>\$200m combined turnover, >\$500m individual), including those who develop masterplanned communities, high and medium density build-to-sell and build-to-rent projects, retirement communities and purpose-built student accommodation, office buildings, industrial warehouses and distribution centres, and health and education facilities
- **Landowners:** landowners looking to activate sites
- **Private equity:** Capital providers who participate in asset transactions
- **Institutional equity:** Large capital providers
- **Builders:** builders who take on small-scale development, or who purchase wholesale from developers
- **Community Housing providers:** community housing providers, who are dependent on private and institutional equity and partnerships with developers
- **Other property acquirers:** non-core business developers
- **End customer:** delays to projects will impact the end value of product. For residential dwellings this could add thousands of dollars to the price of a home.

Given the volume of notifications, it will be almost impossible for timeframes to be met. The property sector has the unique perspective of dealing with governments while seeking approvals necessary for the development of an asset, including planning, heritage and environmental approvals. The undeniable experience with all levels of government is the use substantial and

unreasonable pre-submission requirements and stop-clock mechanisms to extend assessment periods.

These delays will be exacerbated by low ACCC capability to consider the property industry as property transactions have traditionally not featured prominently in ACCC assessments.

**An injection of an overwhelming volume of transactions risks transactions being moved into Phase 2 of an assessment owing to limited resourcing and understanding.**

Without appropriate carve-outs and deemed approvals if timeframes are not met (without stop-clock mechanisms or similar), the resultant delays associated with an overwhelmed regulator inadequately resourced to deal with this volume of assessments will result in:

1. a slowdown and delay in supply chains
2. reduced productivity
3. discouraged domestic and foreign capital into the Australian property sector, which has been critical in shaping our cities over the past 70 years
4. higher development costs and, in the case of residential property, higher house prices and weekly rents.

### CASE STUDY

For a Property Council member in greater Sydney, the average cost of land in a master planned residential community is \$750,000 and the average cost of a dwelling is \$500,000. Land values escalate at approximately 4 per cent per annum (\$2,500 per month), while dwelling construction costs escalate at between 4-5 per cent per annum (\$1,600 per month). The average monthly cost of delay is \$4,000.

Considering the proposed three-phase assessment process that will capture hundreds of residential land transactions each year, a conservative estimate of the time delay associated with the assessment of low-risk transactions is 7.5 months – meaning a **\$30,000 increase in costs that will need to be passed onto a first homebuyer.**

**The delays will:**

1. **almost entirely wipe out the benefit of first homeowner stamp duty exemptions**
2. **impose an additional nearly four months for a typical household to save before purchasing<sup>2</sup>**
3. **add nearly \$70,000 to an average household mortgage, representing extra repayments of nearly \$200 every month.<sup>3</sup>**

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<sup>2</sup> 2001 ABS Census household income data.

<sup>3</sup> [Borrowing Power Calculator - How Much Can I Borrow? \(commbank.com.au\)](https://www.commbank.com.au/borrowing-power-calculator) based on the difference between a \$1 million and \$1.03 million mortgage over 30 years (at 20 September 2024).

## Radically unclear definitions lead to market uncertainty

Stakeholders are being asked to consider legislation without crucial information about how it will apply. Without limitation, clarity must be provided in relation to:

1. The market concentration threshold, which appears likely to be highly problematic for medium size entities. Clarity needs to be urgently provided about how an entity will navigate assessing the definition of “market” and then what its market share looks like on completion of a transaction?
2. How will acquisitions between managed funds with a common manager be considered?
3. Will an acquirer be considered at group-level, or at acquisition vehicle level?
4. How will different transaction structures be considered – for example, joint venture acquisitions and option agreements, both of which are common across property transactions?

## Targeted relief from notification requirements

The paper states that Treasury estimates between 300 to 500 notifications would be made to the regulator each year. Treasury has accepted that there is insufficient or incomplete data to fully quantify the number of notifications expected.

As outlined, we estimate at least 1,340 notifiable property transactions each year.

The serial acquisitions/look-back provisions will lead to a significant volume of transactions requiring notification. Rather than the \$10 million turnover requirement excluding transaction value and reducing the volume of transactions being assessed, we are aware of individual members with more than 20 residential acquisitions valued at less than \$50 million but totalling more than \$400 million across the 3-year look-back period. An average transaction value of \$20 million and seven transactions each year would trigger the serial acquisition clause within 6 months. From that point, everything would be referable.

Reflecting the capital-intensive nature of property transactions, a carve out is required. This would not be unique and carve-outs apply in other jurisdictions including the US, Canada and Korea. These jurisdictions actively compete with Australia for institutional capital.

In the US there is a range of property-related exemptions under the Hart–Scott–Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976. These exemptions relate to acquisition of goods or realty that are transferred in the ordinary course of business, (non-income generating) facilities that have been constructed and held for sale, acquisitions of 'unproductive real property with revenue thresholds for what is 'unproductive', acquisitions of office and residential property (qualifying requirements), hotels/motels and certain related facilities and certain acquisitions by real estate investment trusts. Additionally, there are specific exemptions in relation to certain recreational land, agricultural land and retail space.

In Canada, exemptions exist for real property or goods in the ordinary course of business if the person or persons who propose to acquire the assets would not, as a result of the acquisition, hold all or substantially all of the assets of a business or of an operating segment of a business.

In Korea, a streamlined review process exists which is available to real estate acquisitions by REITs.

This also needs to be considered in the context of the fragmented nature of Australia's property market. In the context of new masterplanned communities, for instance, those MPCs compete

directly with the broader housing market. Data shows that 84 per cent of new home buyers also considered established properties.


Greenfield housing developments such as MPCs do not operate in isolation, nor are they unaffected by broader housing and economic conditions. Consumers looking to purchase a home consider a range of factors, including the distance between the new home and their place of work, lifestyle preferences such as access to recreational facilities, and family needs such as proximity to schools and childcare, in addition to cost.

To balance the unknown variables acquisitions in the number of notifications to be received, and to mitigate the early overreporting of acquisitions, Treasury should otherwise implement a power for the Chair of the ACCC to provide targeted relief to an industry or class of asset.

If a particular industry or class of asset is overrepresented in notifications and is materially impacting on the regulator's capacity to meet its timelines, then the Commission should relieve those industries or class of assets of their notification requirements, or to amend them in such a way to reduce the reporting of acquisitions which do not raise competition concerns.

The Property Council welcomes the opportunity to discuss this submission in more detail. Please contact Dan Rubenach, Policy Manager at [drubenach@propertycouncil.com.au](mailto:drubenach@propertycouncil.com.au) or on 0484 850 815 to arrange a meeting.

Kind regards



**Mike Zorbas**  
Chief Executive

## Appendix A – Property Council submission dated 13 August 2024





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13 August 2024

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To Whom It May Concern

## Mergers and acquisitions reform – exposure draft legislation

The Property Council of Australia (the Property Council) welcomes the opportunity to respond to Treasury's exposure draft of the *Treasury Laws Amendment Bill 2024: Acquisitions* (the proposed reforms).

The Property Council is the peak body for owners and investors in Australia's \$670 billion property industry. We represent owners, fund managers, superannuation trusts, developers, and investors across all four quadrants of property investments: debt, equity, public and private.

The property industry is the country's second largest employer, representing a direct gross domestic product (GDP) contribution of \$232 billion, or 10.6 per cent of total GDP, as well as 18.2 per cent of total tax revenues totalling \$129.6 billion.

Our industry is particularly sensitive to changes in the mergers and acquisitions control regime due to three factors: the value, the volume and the frequency of transactions which take place across the spectrum of residential and commercial assets.<sup>1</sup>

A control regime which creates barriers to entry or expansion in the property market, stymies potential deals and diminishes economic activity damages not just the property industry but the broader economy and prosperity of Australia.

### How uncertainty and delays impact industry and the economy

The Property Council's submission on the November 2023 consultation paper outlined a number of impacts that a poorly calibrated and restrictive merger control regime would have on the property industry, including the impact on the competitive landscape and productivity, as well as the distortion of the market and the bid process.

We are unable to quantify the precise impact of the proposed reforms without the context of the notification thresholds. However, in its 2023 submission to Treasury, the Australian Competition

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<sup>1</sup> Property Council commentary in no way applies to shopping centre or retail matters, only to other commercial assets.

and Consumer Commission (ACCC) proposed an acquirer or target turnover threshold of \$400 million and a transaction value threshold of \$35 million, and we can provide an assessment based on these figures.

Over the past ten years, over 2,900 property transactions have taken place in Australia which would exceed a transaction threshold of \$35 million, or an average of 290 per year.<sup>2</sup> These transactions alone would almost exceed the number of total transactions that Treasury has stated the regulator would look at each year, being 300.

We understand that other submissions may refer to a higher number of transactions above a \$35 million threshold. As such the figure used in this submission should be considered a minimum, conservative estimate.

#### **Case study: REIT**

As an example, an Australian Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) with a turnover over \$400 million has made at least 40 transactions in the past 10 years over \$35 million.

With the proposed reforms there would be a substantial impact on the day-to-day running of the business, further than just the significant regulatory burden of dealing with a protracted competition review process, including the demand on staff or the additional cost of external advisers.

Delays of up to 120 business days (24 weeks) for a Phase 2 in depth review, 170 business days (34 weeks) for a substantial public benefits determination or 230 business days (46 weeks) for a Tribunal determination represents a material risk to the business's operations and the financial performance of the group.

With development or acquisition plans delayed there are revenue impacts and cost implications. Project related expenses including holding costs continue to grow the longer the delay. These costs are borne by the acquirer and vendor, not the regulator, and there is the potential for deterioration in the value of an asset where development is slowed or neglected.

As property values are particularly sensitive to interest rate changes, any delays associated with Phase 2 determinations and further reviews would increase the risk of broken transactions.

With at least 40 transactions over 10 years subject to these reviews, the costs would not be immaterial and would impact directly on the product they deliver, whether that is new commercial and industrial developments to meet the growing economy or delivering much needed housing supply.

Issues with project financing and slowed development timelines lead to a lower delivery capacity, directly impacting jobs and dampening economic activity.

#### **Broader impacts on the economy**

More broadly, the risk of these delays deters domestic and foreign investors from considering Australian real estate as we compete in a global environment for capital where time is one of the greatest costs to projects.

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<sup>2</sup> Data provided by MSCI, property transactions in Australia over 10 years above \$35 million.

Australia has a diverse range of domestic and foreign owners, each with different priorities and aims. However, with reduced interest from investors, and the risk of conducting a transaction is greatly increased, there would be a marked reduction in transaction volumes and subsequent drop in market liquidity.

Lower liquidity leads to poorer outcomes for investors, such as shareholders and superannuation funds, and impacts on their returns, capacity to finance and raise capital, and ultimately influences investor behaviour and risk appetite.

For foreign investors, who remain a primary source of capital in 2024, the resulting impacts are worsened as they navigate Australia's foreign investment framework, including approval by the Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB). Notwithstanding the government's recently announced reforms, FIRB approvals and the associated delays on project timelines significantly impacts investor behaviour.

It is not clear whether the government has assessed these impacts, extrapolated across the economy. Slowed growth and job creation, higher cost of capital and a higher regulatory burden on business will lead to poorer outcomes for the Australian economy.

Entrenching the inefficient allocation of resources, and the associated lost economic benefits from changes in land use, would be coupled with a loss of revenue for state and federal governments from stamp duty and other taxes.

Many transactions, which may have remained confidential throughout the negotiating period, would now have commercially sensitive information placed into a public process. This itself may deter transacting parties from choosing a partner who would be considered at-risk for significant delays due to a competition review.

The effects on the property industry are clear. Uncertainty in dealmaking deters domestic and foreign investors, it reduces transaction volumes and market liquidity, and slows economic activity.

#### **A risk-based framework for industry**

The thresholds as proposed by the ACCC would disproportionately impact the property industry due to the value, volume and frequency of major transactions between market participants.

The Australian property industry shows limited evidence of market concentration amongst its participants.

As property has not been identified as a concentrated industry in Australia, the government should assess it and other industries through a risk-based framework, such as providing for different thresholds for different asset types commensurate with their impact on market concentration and proven (not theoretical) negative outcomes for consumers.

**Recommendation 1:** that the government initiates a parliamentary inquiry into the economic impacts of the *Treasury Laws Amendment Bill 2024: Acquisitions* on the broader economy, including on Australia's competitiveness for domestic and foreign investment

**Recommendation 2:** that Treasury conducts consultation on implementing a risk-based merger control regime with industry specific notification thresholds, such as for property transactions, and consider indexing any monetary thresholds

### Public consultation on the notification thresholds

The Bill seeks to amend the Competition and Consumer Act (CCA) to overhaul the existing framework reviewing mergers and acquisitions and replace it with a mandatory, suspensory administrative model.

As outlined previously however, the Bill does this divorced from the key determinant of the impact to industry: the notification thresholds, including the value of a transaction, the turnover of an entity, or its market or class of asset.

Without any public consultation on these thresholds, we are unable to quantify the precise impact of the proposed regime on the Australian property industry. We believe the government should have consulted on the thresholds prior to or concurrently with the exposure draft legislation.

The government's position paper in April 2024 only mentioned that targeted mandatory notification thresholds would be introduced, and that Treasury anticipates that the thresholds will result in a similar number of notifications to the ACCC each year. Without detail on the thresholds, this claim cannot be assessed by industry.

**Recommendation 3:** the government immediately halts progression of the *Treasury Laws Amendment Bill 2024: Acquisitions*, until such a time as industry has been formally consulted on the notification thresholds, including its transaction, turnover and market share thresholds

### Calibrating the notification thresholds

The government has not yet articulated its plans to resource the ACCC to administer the new regime. Budget 2024-25 outlines that the government will provide \$13.9 million over five years to progress competition reforms, including the mergers and acquisitions reforms being undertaken.

On the current exposure draft, the government would have modelling to suggest what the number of additional personnel, including both administrative and subject matter experts, to meet the (yet undefined) growing number of notifications.

Industry has expressed its concern in the ACCC's capacity to meet its expanded remit and workload, and the lack of procedural safeguards for fee-paying participants who will not have recourse to address these before a proposed review in 2029.

As a priority, and before funding a greater workforce to meet an expanded notification regime, the government should prioritise getting the thresholds calibrated appropriately. This will allow the government to keep its commitment to assessing the same number of proposals each year (approximately 300), to not be burdened with unnecessary and low-risk transactions, and not require significant and ongoing expenditure in order to properly resource the regulator.

### Deeming provisions

The proposed reforms outline that the ACCC, if it reasonably suspects an acquisition will substantially lessen competition, may refer it to a further, in-depth Phase 2 assessment. Without a properly resourced workforce, the ACCC may be incentivised to graduate acquisitions from Phase

1 to Phase 2 in order give itself more time (and resources) to meet its obligations to notifying parties, and receive an additional fee.

Further to this, through the process for considering substantial public benefits applications, the proposed reforms refer to a default position that if the ACCC does not make a determination within the timelines, it is deemed to have refused the application – in essence, no decision means the original determination stands.

Fee-paying parties expect the regulator to making prompt reviews and be resourced to do so, and the proposed reforms should not entrench a position that inherently protects it from poorly calibrated thresholds or being under resourced by government.

**Recommendation 4:** that Treasury should amend the process for considering substantial public benefits applications to align it with the proposed provisions in *Schedule 1, item 39, subsections 51ABZB(2) and (3) of the CAA*, where if the ACCC does not making a determination within the appropriate period, the acquisition may be put into effect

## Other key issues

### Removal of land as an ordinary course of business exclusion

The proposed reforms reduce the ordinary course of business exclusion to remove land and patents, and ensure they are treated as acquisitions for the purpose of the Act.

As outlined previously, the property industry is impacted disproportionately due to the value, volume and frequency of transactions that take place. Introducing an economy-wide removal of this exemption impacts not just the property industry but all industries which intersect with land.

Rather than target the entire economy, and further risk the unnecessary notification of a number of transactions, we recommend to alternatively allow the Minister to determine which targeted class of assets or businesses would not receive an exemption.

This will better meet the government's intention to implement a risk-based and targeted regime.

**Recommendation 5:** that Treasury reinstate land as an ordinary course of business exclusion to acquisitions provisions, and empower the Minister to remove the exemption for targeted classes of assets, businesses or markets

### Changes to the substantial lessening of competition test

The proposed reforms provide a new definition for 'substantial lessening of competition', which now includes "...creating, strengthening or entrenching a substantial degree of power in a particular market or any market", and will now cover misuse of market power, anti-competitive contracts, arrangements and undertakings.

This proposed definition goes further than the pre-existing legal threshold and was not consulted on in the November 2023 discussion paper, and its expanded remit not presented by Treasury during the April 2024 government response.

The proposed changes offer uncertainty for industry as it diverges from the existing definition as established through legislation and case law, and would be inconsistent with how substantial lessening of competition is understood elsewhere in the law.

**Recommendation 6:** that Treasury conduct a separate consultation on its proposed changes to the substantial lessening of competition test, removed from the broader consultation on the *Treasury Laws Amendment 2024: Acquisitions Bill*, and investigate preserving the existing definition currently defined through legislation and established case law

### **Three-year lookback provision**

The proposed reforms refer to a provision to review the cumulative effect of a proposed acquisition with any other acquisitions by the parties concerned in the previous three-year period.

The provision will have regard to any acquisitions from 1 January 2023 (and onwards). The retrospectivity of this provision will mean that parties who have entered into an agreement subject to the merger and acquisition regulation of the day, and prior to this legislation becoming law, may be penalised for their actions in the future.

The government should consider the impact that changes to the substantial lessening of competition test would have on this provision, and ensure that deals undertaken under a different definition are not re-assessed at a later stage under a new definition.

**Recommendation 7:** that the government should amend the ACCC's process for considering acquisitions and review the three-year lookback provision to ensure any changes to the substantial lessening of competition test are not retrospective

### **Corporate structures**

Clarity is required on how certain common corporate structures would be treated under the proposed reforms. For example, regarding stapled structures noting that many REITs have securities that are comprised of a unit (of a unit trust) that is stapled to a share in a company, which are then traded together. This is relevant to the provisions for permitting reorganisations that occur from one side of the staple to the other.

Further to this, clarity is sought on the role of custodians and trustees in circumstances where they are not in-effect controlling a trust, and aligning the treatment of units in a unit trust and shares in a company.

### **Presumption of control**

The proposed reforms introduce a broad definition of control, with a presumption in the case of acquisitions of shares that if an acquiring party's voting power is 20 per cent or more, it controls the body corporate (and thus is subject to the merger and acquisitions control regime).

The key issue identified is that this presumption is rebuttable, which would allow a participant to argue that it does not control the body corporate, or for the ACCC to argue that a participant below the 20 per cent threshold also controls the body corporate.

By establishing such a low threshold for presumed control at 20 per cent, there will be a significant new burden on participants to prove they aren't in control between the 20-50 per cent range, and therefore risk the associated impacts of the new merger control regime.

In practice, the proposed 20 per cent threshold will inadvertently pick up a large volume of transactions where there is no control, creating an unnecessary burden both on market participants and the ACCC.

The proposed threshold is also at odds with ordinary concepts of control such as those set out in the *Corporations Act 2001(Cth)*. By having a bespoke concept of control, it will make the regime cumbersome for market participants to adhere to.

Further to this, the April 2024 position paper stated that the ACCC will not have the ability to 'call-in' mergers or acquisitions below the thresholds for review. However, a rebuttable provision for acquisitions below the 20 per cent voting threshold will in effect allow the regulator to require many acquisitions that strictly fall outside the threshold to require assessment (paragraph 2.6 of the explanatory memorandum).

Without clarity on the process for reviewing or rebutting a presumption of control, it is unclear whether this represents a part of the Phase 1 determination process, or a pre-Phase 1 process not outlined in the explanatory materials.

**Recommendation 8:** that Treasury should review the presumption of control provision in *Schedule 1, item 39, subsection 51ABC(2) of the CCA*, including investigating raising the 20 per cent ownership threshold or reverting to the existing definition of control in the *Corporations Act 2001* and established case law

The Property Council welcomes the opportunity to discuss this submission in more detail. Please contact Dan Rubenach, Policy Manager at [drubenach@propertycouncil.com.au](mailto:drubenach@propertycouncil.com.au) to arrange a meeting.

Yours faithfully



**Antony Knep**

Executive Director – Capital Markets

## Appendix A

### List of Recommendations

**Recommendation 1:** that the government initiates a parliamentary inquiry into the economic impacts of the *Treasury Laws Amendment Bill 2024: Acquisitions* on the broader economy, including on Australia's competitiveness for domestic and foreign investment

**Recommendation 2:** that Treasury conducts consultation on implementing a risk-based merger control regime with industry specific notification thresholds, such as for property transactions, and consider indexing any monetary thresholds

**Recommendation 3:** the government immediately halts progression of the *Treasury Laws Amendment Bill 2024: Acquisitions*, until such a time as industry has been formally consulted on the notification thresholds, including its transaction, turnover and market share thresholds

**Recommendation 4:** that Treasury should amend the process for considering substantial public benefits applications to align it with the proposed provisions in *Schedule 1, item 39, subsections 51ABZB(2) and (3) of the CAA*, where if the ACCC does not making a determination within the appropriate period, the acquisition may be put into effect

**Recommendation 5:** that Treasury reinstate land as an ordinary course of business exclusion to acquisitions provisions, and empower the Minister to remove the exemption for targeted classes of assets, businesses or markets

**Recommendation 6:** that Treasury conduct a separate consultation on its proposed changes to the substantial lessening of competition test, removed from the broader consultation on the *Treasury Laws Amendment 2024: Acquisitions Bill*, and investigate preserving the existing definition currently defined through legislation and established case law

**Recommendation 7:** that the government should amend the ACCC's process for considering acquisitions and review the three-year lookback provision to ensure any changes to the substantial lessening of competition test are not retrospective

**Recommendation 8:** that Treasury should review the presumption of control provision in *Schedule 1, item 39, subsection 51ABC(2) of the CCA*, including investigating raising the 20 per cent ownership threshold or reverting to the existing definition of control in the *Corporations Act 2001* and established case law